publ-mit-podpubl-mit-podGrüb, Jens2024-04-082024-04-082020-01-142019https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6459This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.engPartial collusionTacit collusionMergersCoordinated effectsNon-coordinated effectsUmbrella effects330UnternehmenszusammenschlussWorkingPaper1687247234urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-16981