Browsing by Person "Lehmann, Sibylle H."

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Political rights, taxation, and firm valuation
evidence from Saxony around 1900
(2012) Opitz, Alexander; Lehmann, Sibylle H.; Hauber, Philipp
The extension of the franchise to social groups with less property and income is associated with greater income redistribution from the rich to the poor and extension in the provision of public goods, which leads to the growth of government expenditure. All of these expected changes are costly and therefore a higher taxation of citizens and industrial firms can be expected, which might have negative effects on investors behavior. The present paper studies the effects of changes in the suffrage in the Kingdom of Saxony at the end of the 19th Century on stock market prices of Saxon firms listed on the Berlin stock exchange: Here the electoral law was changed twice: In 1896 a very restrictive franchise was introduced, which was abolished in 1909 and replaced by a more democratic electoral law. By applying standard event study methodology, we can provide evidence that the restriction of the electoral law had positive effects on Saxon firms on the stock market, where by the extension in 1909 had negative effects on the stock market.
Taking firms to the stock market
IPOs and the importance of large banks in imperial Germany 1896-1913
(2012) Lehmann, Sibylle H.
Large universal banks played a major role for Germany?s industrialisation because they provided loans to the industry and thereby helped firms to overcome liquidity constraints. Previous research has also argued that they were equally important on the German stock market. The present paper provides quantitative and qualitative evidence that although the market for underwriters was dominated by a small oligopoly of six large banks, there was still perceptible competition, which kept fees and short run profits low. Another interesting finding of the paper is the absence of a signalling effect to investors. Neither underpricing nor the one year performance was different for the IPOs issued by one of the Big Six. Thus, although the German IPO business was in the hands of a small oligopoly, investors did not benefit from the lack of competition. One explanation is that the quality of IPOs on the German stock market of the time was very good in general caused by the competition between underwriters, but also by the tight regulation of underwriting, which ensured the quality of all firms on the German stock market.