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Institut für Financial Management

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/23

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Browsing Institut für Financial Management by Subject "Bank run"

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    A computational study on the effects of the organizational structures on the risk of different types of banking groups
    (2023) Jamshidisafari, Saeed; Burghof, Hans-Peter
    In this dissertation, two theoretical models are used to compare centralized and decentralized banking structures. In the first approach, the problem for both banks is to choose an expansive or restrictive credit policy without having complete knowledge of the state of the overall and local economies. Observing and appraising verifiable information (hard information) is the benefit of the centralized banks, whereas considering unverifiable information (soft information) about the local economies, so-called soft signals, is the important asset of the decentralized banks. To compare two banking systems, the risk-return trade-off method is used to determine which type of banking system might have better performance. Although the overestimation of the local economy may have a negative impact, this soft signal has a quite positive impact on risk measures in general. As a result, decentralized bank managers are better at detecting bad loans in their banks. In addition, because small banks have less bureaucracy, the borrower can obtain credit more effortlessly and swiftly. In the second approach, a theoretical bank run model based on Chari and Jagannathan (1988) is developed by implementing a cheap talk game to compare banking structures during bank shocks when managers communicate strategically with depositors to prevent non-efficient bank runs. These two banks behaved considerably differently in the local economy, and this issue is directly tied to regional culture. The limitation of punishment in the legal system incentivizes the management system in centralized banks at some point to be cunning. Consequently, based on the modified model, the higher the punishment or the lower the salary, the less likely the manager is to be persuaded to lie. On the other hand, in small banks, trust and soft information between bank management and depositors protect inefficient bank runs. A decentralized banking system can improve the financial systems credibility by mitigating undesirable shocks during times of crisis. Hence, having decentralized banks in the banking structure increases the depositors’ welfare.