Browsing by Subject "Heterogenes Agentenmodell"

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Institutions, contracts, and regulation of housing financing
(2023) Braun, Julia; Burghof, Hans-Peter
The real estate market and, more specifically, the housing market is one of the most important markets of an economy. It impacts public health, influences social relations and crime, triggers other’s sector growth, and thus affects the prosperity of an economy. The close interconnectedness between economic sectors creates mutual dependencies and spillover effects from one market to another. Due to this, a stable and resistant housing market is in common public, economic, and political interest. The prediction of the development of the housing market, however, is highly challenging as it displays several individual features. One is its high capital intensity. What drives housing investment is sustainable access to housing financing. As sufficient funding is a precondition for acquiring residential property, mortgage lending institutions play a decisive role in the housing market. They enable home seekers to become homeowners and, at the same time, decide by whom and when a residential property can be bought. Furthermore, they influence housing prices. By either granting loans or rejecting applicants and conducting other business, the demand for dwellings is influenced which affects prices. This was clearly evidenced by the latest financial crisis. A second special feature of the housing market is its distinct heterogeneity. From various perspectives, housing is, above all, particularly individual. Dwellings must meet individual circumstances, habits, and preferences. Furthermore, they need to fit into geographical or political circumstances. To meet these individual needs, some financial systems are quite diverse, consisting of manifold types of financial intermediaries that offer several products to finance a residential property. Others are rather uniform, characterized mainly by privately organized institutions, focused on common banking business. This dissertation investigates the impact of different types of financial institutions, financial contracts, and financial regulation on the housing market. The first part investigates whether various lending practices of different types of financial institutions affect housing market cycles differently. We develop a heterogeneous agent-based model that mimics a real-world housing market, consisting of potential home buyers and sellers who trade residential property. Financial intermediaries finance residential property and, therefore, mainly determine whether housing investment can be realized. We create a heterogeneous financial market with special emphasis on two institutional bank types: conventional banks (CBs) and building and loan associations (BLs). Especially in Germany and continental Europe, both serve the mortgage lending market while BLs constitute a peculiar but essential real estate financier. In our research, BLs represent an example of specialized financial intermediaries. Contrasting the mortgage granting decisions of the two bank types that arise out of varying business models and specialized institutional regulations, we find that CBs exercise procyclic mortgage lending that exacerbates prevailing up- or downturns in the housing market. Using BLs’ core product, contractual saving for housing (CSH), they put less emphasis on collateral values. Instead, they use information out of relationship lending which leads to less pronounced market cycles and more stable housing prices. Computational experiments reveal that a heterogeneous financial market, consisting of both CBs and BLs creates the most stable housing market and, at the same time, provides homeownership for a larger share of the economy. As the first part of the dissertation suggests a diversified financial market with differing institutional features and heterogeneous product landscapes to stabilize the housing market and diminish the risk of crises, the second part extends the research scope to embrace regulatory environments. I introduce an extended heterogeneous agent-based model of a housing and a financial market to assess whether it is reasonable to impose homogenous regulatory requirements for heterogeneous financial institutions out of the perspective of housing, capital, and financial market stability. In addition to the real estate market, where potential buyers and sellers can trade dwellings, I model a capital market on which banks can trade a standardized share portfolio that depicts alternative investment opportunities for financial institutions. If banks engage in risky business which is either to finance housing investments or trading shares, Basel III requires them to hold a specified amount of equity. Banks’ business activities are thus restricted by the prevailing capital adequacy requirements (CAR). Via computational experiments, I introduce a heterogeneous regulation in terms of different levels of CAR for a special type of financial intermediary, BLs, while CAR for CBs are held fixed. The results provide evidence that imposing CAR on banks is effective in increasing market stability and the resilience of the banking sector. The obligation to meet CAR restricts risky business activities and increases banks loss absorbency capacity. However, stability is not only a monotonic function of capital. Elevating CAR for BLs worsens stability measures and banking soundness. The study reveals that the institutional type of BLs and their special regulation imposes a risk-mitigating and stabilizing effect on the housing, the capital, and the financial market which can be intensified if CAR are aligned to their individual business model. These findings advocate in favor of heterogeneous CAR that shape market structures and create most stable market conditions. The third part of this dissertation investigates a special component of the current regulatory requirements of Basel III, the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB). The macroprudential tool strives to counteract the issue of procyclicality of the previous regulatory rules. Conducting computational experiments in an artificial market setting, we examine the macroeconomic performance of the CCyB by evaluating the dynamics of key stability indicators of the housing and the financial market. Under four different scenarios, an undisturbed market, a financial shock scenario, a positive housing demand shock scenario, and in times of a housing bubble, we test whether the macroprudential tool meets its regulatory goals. Doing this, we find that, in general, the CCyB performs well in stabilizing the housing and the financial market in all of the tested market settings. It is not able, however, to prevent any of the simulated crises to occur. Furthermore, its effectiveness depends on the magnitude of the shock and on how much buffer has been built up by banks in the previous periods. A CCyB introduced at the wrong time might even affect market conditions procyclically. As the introduction of a CCyB is currently discussed in different countries, this study contributes to current regulatory issues and provides valuable insights. With its three parts, this dissertation provides new insights into the relationship between financial and housing markets. Incorporating the special features of the housing market, it reveals the merits of a diversified financial market and the existence of specialized financial institutions and heterogeneous financial products. Furthermore, the results argue in favor of a heterogeneous regulation. Additionally, it provides information about the effectiveness of a currently discussed regulatory component, the CCyB. Hereby, this dissertation contributes to existing literature and has important implications for the design of financial markets and regulatory capital requirements in order to stabilize one of the most important markets of an economy, the housing market.