Browsing by Subject "Institutional arrangements"

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Collective action in crop-livestock farming systems : a case study from Burkina Faso
(2022) Yameogo, Guesbeogo Viviane; Birner, Regina
To end hunger and increase food security, substantial investments will be required. In sub-Saharan Africa, smallholder agricultural households have a major role to play. However, finding the right instruments to stimulate agricultural growth at the household level requires an accurate understanding of agrarian households’ behaviour. This thesis aimed to contribute to a better understanding of agrarian households, focusing on the institutional conditions shaping cooperation within polygynous households. Indeed, polygynous households are widespread in African societies, but their specific features are relatively neglected in the agricultural development literature. Moreover, the theory of collective action has, so far, been applied at the community-level, but rarely at the intra-household level. To address this knowledge gap, case studies of two ethnic communities, the Fulani and the Mossi, were conducted. The research explored the institutional arrangements shaping the allocation of resources within polygynous households and examined the structural conditions under which cooperation occurs. The second chapter of this thesis reviews the discourse on agricultural households’ behaviour. Reviewing the empirical evidence, the chapter examines the adequacy of existing economic conceptualisations of agricultural households and their generalisability to West-African settings. Drawing on insights from anthropology and feminist perspectives, the chapter highlights the shortcomings of conventional household models, and the failure to consider gender and intergenerational relations of production. The third chapter analyses the challenges underlying cooperation in agricultural households. The chapter uncovers the contractual arrangements shaping the allocation of resources for food production. Drawing on the natural resource management literature, the chapter examines how households’ member’s characteristics, including their socially accepted roles and responsibilities, shape their incentive structures and determine resource pooling. Chapter 4 examines an essential determinant of collective action: trust. The chapter investigates the correlation between trust and productive and reproductive activities. The chapter makes an innovative methodological contribution to the study of cooperation, applying an experimental trust game to co-wives in polygynous households. The critical review of the economic literature challenges the existing representations of agrarian households in sub-Saharan Africa. The review calls for a redefinition of the units of production and for cautious assessment of conventional economic theories. The review recommends a framework that encompasses the complexities and diversity of behaviour in agrarian households. Integrating theories from feminist and anthropological literature can support this endeavour. Chapter 3 reveals that the contractual arrangements embedded in the rules and norms defining socially-accepted behaviour, influence the patterns of intrahousehold resource mobilisation and the likelihood of cooperation among household members. Agricultural household members were found to pool, exchange or split resources based on their roles and positions within the household arena. Implicit monitoring and sanction systems were identified, which shape the incentive structures of agrarian household member and determine whether cooperation will occur. The final chapter revealed that trust can mediate cooperation between co-wives, depending on the nature of the activity. No correlation was found between trust and co-wives’ likelihood to pool labour on individual plots. However, a strong correlation was identified between trust among co-wives and income pooling for food purchase, highlighting the importance of uncertainty and of existing norms on the outcomes of cooperation in agricultural households. The thesis concludes that collective action in polygynous agrarian households does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, collective action is the outcome of several processes and mechanisms. Policymakers should be aware of these internal arrangements, and their implications for intra-household resource allocation. The success of agricultural policies depends on these considerations.