Browsing by Subject "Zentraler Kontrahent"

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The effect of central counterparties on counterparty risk, liquidity and systemic risk of Over-the-Counter markets
(2020) Schönemann, Gregor H.; Gehde-Trapp, Monika
The introduction of central clearing on formerly bilaterally cleared derivatives markets has been one of the biggest changes in the landscape of financial markets during the last decade. The studies in this thesis examine this landmark in financial markets regulation by analyzing its effect on three relevant areas of financial market stability: counterparty risk, market liquidity and systemic risk. The studies in this dissertation examine the effect of central clearing on these three areas empirically on the market for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) by using data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The results show that the option to clear trades with an arguably very creditworthy Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP) leads to varying effects depending on the risk profile of the CDS contracts. In chapter 2, we show that the introduction of central clearing decreases the netting efficiency of CDS contracts and leads to a higher fragmentation of CDS positions. This negative effect is concentrated in CDS contracts that were relatively efficiently netted in bilateral markets. The netting efficiency of ex-ante less efficiently netted CDS contracts, however, is not decreased by the introduction of central clearing. In chapter 3, I use a regression discontinuity design to show that central clearing affects market liquidity of CDS contracts positively. This effect, however, is concentrated in CDS contracts with high fundamental risk and high liquidity risk. Furthermore, I show that the positive liquidity effect can be explained by a lower sensitivity of market liquidity to counterparty risk and lower regulatory costs. In chapter 4, we use different time series techniques in order to show that the default dependencies among the dominant CDS market participants decrease with the introduction of central clearing. All in all, the results show the potentially stabilizing effect of CCPs on the financial market architecture of derivatives markets. However, this effect depends on the contracts that are made eligible for central clearing by CCPs. High-risk contracts exhibit by far the highest benefits from the central clearing option. For CCPs, however, low-risk contracts of high liquidity and high trading volumes may be most attractive to make eligible for central clearing as they maximize revenues and minimize risk management costs. This shows the conflict between regulators and regulated entities and the necessity of bespoke financial markets regulation.