The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers

Trost, Michael

The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers

dc.contributor.author	Trost, Michael	de
dc.date.accessioned	2024-04-08T09:00:49Z
dc.date.available	2024-04-08T09:00:49Z
dc.date.created	2021-06-23
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.description.abstract	We study the collusive efficacy of competition clauses (CC) such as the meeting competition clause (MCC) and the beating competition clauses (BCC) in a general framework. In contrast to previous theoretical studies, we allow for repeated interaction among the retailers and heterogeneity in their sales capacities. Besides that, the selection of the form of the CC is endogeneized. The retailers choose among a wide range of CC types - including the conventional ones such as the MCC and the BCCs with lump sum refunds. Several common statements about the collusive (in)efficacy of CCs cannot be upheld in our framework. We show that in the absence of hassle costs, MCCs might induce collusion in homogeneous markets even if they are adopted only by few retailers. If hassle and implementation costs are mild, collusion can be enforced by BCCs with lump sum refunds. Remarkably, these fundings hold for any reasonable rationing rule. However, a complete specification of all collusive CCs is in general impossible without any further reference to the underlying rationing rule.	en
dc.identifier.swb	1761105566
dc.identifier.uri	https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6623
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-19077
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2021,04
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	en
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	de
dc.rights.uri	http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/doku/lic_mit_pod.php
dc.subject	Competition clauses	en
dc.subject	Price-matching guarantee	en
dc.subject	Price-beating guarantee	en
dc.subject	Anti-competitive practice	en
dc.subject	Capacity-constrained oligopoly	en
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.subject.gnd	Wettbewerb	de
dc.title	The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers	de
dc.type.dcmi	Text	de
dc.type.dini	WorkingPaper	de
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	en
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	de
local.bibliographicCitation.publisherPlace	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.faculty.number	3	de
local.institute.number	520	de
local.opus.number	1907
local.series.issueNumber	2021,04
local.series.title	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
local.university	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.university.faculty	Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences	en
local.university.faculty	Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften	de
local.university.institute	Institute for Economics	en
local.university.institute	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre	de

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