The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers

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dc.contributor.authorTrost, Michaelde
dc.date.accessioned2024-04-08T09:00:49Z
dc.date.available2024-04-08T09:00:49Z
dc.date.created2021-06-23
dc.date.issued2021
dc.description.abstractWe study the collusive efficacy of competition clauses (CC) such as the meeting competition clause (MCC) and the beating competition clauses (BCC) in a general framework. In contrast to previous theoretical studies, we allow for repeated interaction among the retailers and heterogeneity in their sales capacities. Besides that, the selection of the form of the CC is endogeneized. The retailers choose among a wide range of CC types - including the conventional ones such as the MCC and the BCCs with lump sum refunds. Several common statements about the collusive (in)efficacy of CCs cannot be upheld in our framework. We show that in the absence of hassle costs, MCCs might induce collusion in homogeneous markets even if they are adopted only by few retailers. If hassle and implementation costs are mild, collusion can be enforced by BCCs with lump sum refunds. Remarkably, these fundings hold for any reasonable rationing rule. However, a complete specification of all collusive CCs is in general impossible without any further reference to the underlying rationing rule.en
dc.identifier.swb1761105566
dc.identifier.urihttps://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6623
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-19077
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesHohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2021,04
dc.rights.licensepubl-mit-poden
dc.rights.licensepubl-mit-podde
dc.rights.urihttp://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/doku/lic_mit_pod.php
dc.subjectCompetition clausesen
dc.subjectPrice-matching guaranteeen
dc.subjectPrice-beating guaranteeen
dc.subjectAnti-competitive practiceen
dc.subjectCapacity-constrained oligopolyen
dc.subject.ddc330
dc.subject.gndWettbewerbde
dc.titleThe collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailersde
dc.type.dcmiTextde
dc.type.diniWorkingPaperde
local.accessuneingeschränkter Zugriffen
local.accessuneingeschränkter Zugriffde
local.bibliographicCitation.publisherPlaceUniversität Hohenheimde
local.export.bibtex@techreport{Trost2021, url = {https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6623}, author = {Trost, Michael}, title = {The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers}, year = {2021}, school = {Universität Hohenheim}, series = {Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences}, }
local.export.bibtexAuthorTrost, Michael
local.export.bibtexKeyTrost2021
local.export.bibtexType@techreport
local.faculty.number3de
local.institute.number520de
local.opus.number1907
local.series.issueNumber2021,04
local.series.titleHohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
local.universityUniversität Hohenheimde
local.university.facultyFaculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciencesen
local.university.facultyFakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftende
local.university.instituteInstitute for Economicsen
local.university.instituteInstitut für Volkswirtschaftslehrede

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