Entry regulation and competition : evidence from retail and labormarkets of pharmacists

Unsorg, Maximiliane; Rostam-Afschar, Davud

Entry regulation and competition : evidence from retail and labormarkets of pharmacists

dc.contributor.author	Unsorg, Maximiliane	de
dc.contributor.author	Rostam-Afschar, Davud	de
dc.date.accessioned	2024-04-08T09:00:49Z
dc.date.available	2024-04-08T09:00:49Z
dc.date.created	2021-06-23
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.description.abstract	We examine a deregulation of German pharmacists to assess its effects on retail and labor markets. From 2004 onward, the reform allowed pharmacists to expand their single-store firms and to open or acquire up to three affliated stores. This partial deregulation of multi-store prohibition reduced the cost of firm expansion substantially and provides the basis for our analysis. We develop a theoretical model that suggests that the general limitation of the total store number per firm to four is excessively restrictive. Firms with high managerial effciency will open more stores per furm and have higher labor demand. Our empirical analysis uses very rich information from the administrative panel data on the universe of pharmacies from 2002 to 2009 and their affiliated stores matched with survey data, which provide additional information on the characteristics of expanding firms before and after the reform. We find a sharp immediate increase in entry rates, which continues to be more than five-fold of its pre-reform level after five years for expanding firms. Expanding firms can double revenues but not profits after three years. We show that the increase of the number of employees by 50% after five years and the higher overall employment in the local markets, which increased by 40%, can be attributed to the deregulation.	en
dc.identifier.swb	1761105094
dc.identifier.uri	https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6622
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-19061
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2021,03
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	en
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	de
dc.rights.uri	http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/doku/lic_mit_pod.php
dc.subject	Regulation	en
dc.subject	Acquisition	en
dc.subject	Entry	en
dc.subject	Market concentration	en
dc.subject	Wages	en
dc.subject	Employment	en
dc.subject	Pharmacists	en
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.subject.gnd	Arzneimittelmarkt	de
dc.subject.gnd	Deregulierung	de
dc.title	Entry regulation and competition : evidence from retail and labormarkets of pharmacists	de
dc.type.dcmi	Text	de
dc.type.dini	WorkingPaper	de
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	en
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	de
local.bibliographicCitation.publisherPlace	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.faculty.number	3	de
local.institute.number	520	de
local.opus.number	1906
local.series.issueNumber	2021,03
local.series.title	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
local.university	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.university.faculty	Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences	en
local.university.faculty	Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften	de
local.university.institute	Institute for Economics	en
local.university.institute	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre	de

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