Unraveling the spreading pattern of collusively effectivecompetition clauses

Trost, Michael

Unraveling the spreading pattern of collusively effectivecompetition clauses

dc.contributor.author	Trost, Michael	de
dc.date.accessioned	2024-04-08T09:02:08Z
dc.date.available	2024-04-08T09:02:08Z
dc.date.created	2022-03-29
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.description.abstract	Meanwhile, the Industrial Organization literature gives several reasons why retailers adopt competition clauses (CCs) such as price matching or price beating guarantees. The motivations underlying the CCs might affect their forms and spread. In this paper, we unravel the spreading pattern of CCs in markets where they are used as a device to facilitate tacit collusion. It turns out that in homogeneous markets with capacity-constrained retailers, the retailers with the largest capacities are most inclined to adopt CCs. Our finding is in line with results of earlier studies on the formation of price leadership, which suggest that the retailers with the largest capacities take on the leadership position. On the other side, we find that in some market instances, retailers have to resort to CCs of non-conventional forms (i.e., of forms uncommon in real commercial life) to induce the most robust collusion. However, it turns out that this peculiar finding can be resolved for markets with additional characteristics. For example, if there exist market dominant retailers or the residual market demand is specified by efficient rationing, the most resilient collusion can also be enforced by CCs of conventional forms.	en
dc.identifier.swb	1796837954
dc.identifier.uri	https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6708
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-20152
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2022,01
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	en
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	de
dc.rights.uri	http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/doku/lic_mit_pod.php
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.subject.gnd	Wettbewerbsverhalten	de
dc.title	Unraveling the spreading pattern of collusively effectivecompetition clauses	de
dc.type.dcmi	Text	de
dc.type.dini	WorkingPaper	de
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	en
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	de
local.bibliographicCitation.publisherPlace	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.faculty.number	3	de
local.institute.number	520	de
local.opus.number	2015
local.series.issueNumber	2022,01
local.series.title	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
local.university	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.university.faculty	Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences	en
local.university.faculty	Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften	de
local.university.institute	Institute for Economics	en
local.university.institute	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre	de

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