Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/24

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Infant mortality and the role of seigneurial tenure in Canada East, 1851
(2015) Geloso, Vincent; Arsenault Morin, Alex; Kufenko, Vadim
This paper aims to explain differences in infant mortality across the colony of Quebec, known in the 1850s as Canada East, by institutional settings. Areas settled under French laws (known as seigneurial law) implied important transfers from peasants to landlords through private taxes and duties, restrictions on mobility, scant provision of public goods and disincentives to invest in agricultural productivity. As a result, areas under this law system tended to be poor and prone to high mortality. Upon conquering Quebec, the British maintained French land laws but, in 1791, the boundaries of its application were frozen – all newly settled lands would be under British land laws. By 1851, the two legal systems had cohabited for six decades – allowing us to compare them. Using the 1851 census, we argue that French seigneurial law – which reduced living standards through a variety of channels – translated into higher rates of infant mortality. After estimating a Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression we find that the effect of seigneurial tenure results in an increase in infant death rates from 43.79 to 44.89 for the age group below one and from 5.21 to 5.277 for the age group from one to five. Additionally, we conduct robustness checks by limiting the sample to large settlements and changing the age groups for the dependent variable.
Monopsony and industrial development in nineteenth century Quebec : the impact of seigneurial tenure
(2016) Kufenko, Vadim; Arsenault Morin, Alex; Geloso, Vincent
We argue that the system of seigneurial tenure used in the province of Quebec until the mid-nineteenth centurya system which allowed significant market power in the establishment of plants, factories and mills, combined with restrictions on the mobility of the labor force within each seigneurial estateis best understood as a system of regionalized monopsonies in the non-farm sector. Seigneurs had incentives to reduce their employment in those sectors to reduce wage rates. We use the fact that later, with the Constitutional Act of 1791, all new settled lands had to be settled under a different system (British land laws). This natural experiment allows us to test our hypothesis that seigneurial tenure was a monopsony, using data from the 1831 and 1851 Lower Canada censuses. We find strong evidence that this difference in tenure partially explains the gap in industrial development between Quebec and the neighboring colony of Ontario.

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