Browsing by Subject "Markt"

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Electronic service allocation with private quality information
(2017) Widmer, Tobias; Kirn, Stefan
The efficient allocation of electronic services is a complex business problem. Customers demand electronic services from service providers who supply these services at a specified quality of service (QoS). Electronic marketplaces provide a platform on which multiple customers and multiple providers negotiate the allocation of electronic services. Such marketplaces might be administrated by government authorities or large corporations who aim at a socially optimal allocation. This research addresses the allocation problem for electronic services with private quality information from a mechanism design perspective. By assigning specific reservation functions, multiple customers and multiple providers enunciate their preferences for these services. Once all demands and offers for electronic services are submitted, the mechanism determines an allocation that maximizes the sum of the aggregated preferences. However, the design of such mechanisms is difficult because of the following requirements: (1) Double-sided competition: Multiple competitive customers and multiple competitive providers must be matched together appropriately to generate maximal surplus, (2) QoS-awareness: The QoS desired by customers and the QoS offered by service providers must be internalized in the allocation mechanism, (3) private information: The mechanism must facilitate the allocation of electronic services for which any QoS information is unknown, (4) incentive compatibility: The mechanism has to provide adequate incentives to strategic individuals in order to ensure truthful bidding, (5) individual rationality: The participation decision in the mechanism must be voluntarily to all bidders, (6) budget balance: The mechanism must omit any independent intermediary in order to facilitate distributed decision-making among the participants, (7) optimality: The ultimate objective of the mechanism is to achieve an outcome that is optimal from a social welfare perspective. Standard impossibility theorems from mechanism design theory assert that meeting these requirements simultaneously is not attainable. In particular, ex post optimality cannot be attained when incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance are required as well. Therefore, the mechanism designer must decide about a viable tradeoff of these requirements. One possible compromise in the presence of privately known QoS is to derive a second-best mechanism that satisfies incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. The outcome of such second-best mechanisms can be used to estimate the efficiency loss that must be tolerated in comparison to the first-best outcome. The objectives of this research are to (1) develop a second-best mechanism for allocating electronic services with private quality information and (2) study its efficiency properties in a set of simulation experiments to demonstrate its usefulness. All experiments imply that the asymptotic efficiency of the second-best mechanism is bounded away from 100% even for large markets. This finding is related to the economic concept of informational smallness, which is defined as the incremental impact of an participants QoS on the demand of an electronic service. In the proposed model, each provider offers a service of distinct QoS, and each customer demands a service of distinct QoS. It is this feature of differentiated service quality that prevents the participants from becoming informationally small as the market becomes large. If each participant’s private information about QoS follows the uniform distribution, the mechanism must tolerate an efficiency loss of more than 31% for an increasing number of customers and providers. In contrast, if private quality information is normally distributed among participants, this research finds that the mechanisms asymptotic inefficiency can be reduced to about 7% as the market size increases on both sides. With asymmetric, beta-distributed QoS, the mechanism arrives at an asymptotic efficiency of more than 91%. These findings are crucial to social planners because in designing service allocation with double-sided competition, they can obtain an accurate estimation of potential efficiency losses that arise from asymmetric information about QoS. On the other hand, the social planner can ensure that every allocation decision is made by the participants only. Hence, the emerging mechanism implementation eludes the need for an external, independent decision maker.
Prognose der Entwicklung des Agrartechnikmarktes: eine Expertenbefragung nach der Delphi-Methode
(2001) Wübben, Dirk; Vorgrimler, Daniel
Das Ziel der Studie ist die Prognose der Entwicklungen auf dem Agrartechnikmarkt für Deutschland und Westeuropa. Als Prognoseverfahren diente die Delphi-Methode, eine mehrstufige Expertenbefragung mit Rückkopplung. Als zentrale Untersuchungsbereiche umfasst die Studie zum einen die Ermittlung der wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren auf die Nachfrage und die Abschätzung der Agrartechniknachfrage der Jahre 2005 und 2010 und zum anderen die Abschätzung der zukünftigen Entwicklung der Angebotsstruktur. Des Weiteren werden die wichtigsten erwarteten Tendenzen im Marketing aufgezeigt. Im Zusammenhang mit dem in der Landwirtschaft erwarteten Strukturwandel ist damit zu rechnen, dass wirtschaftliche Gesichtspunkte bei den Investitionsentscheidungen der Landwirte eine immer größere Bedeutung erlangen. Während für die stückmäßige Nachfrage nach Agrartechnik ein Rückgang prognostiziert wird, wird nach Ansicht der Experten ? bedingt durch die erwarteten qualitativen Verschiebungen ? die monetäre Nachfrage relativ stabil bleiben. Auf der Angebotsseite wird eine weitere Zunahme der Marktkonzentration erwartet. Der Wandel vom Verkäufer- zum Käufermarkt wird sich fortsetzen. Daher treten im Marketing kundenbezogene Serviceleistungen in den Vordergrund.
Quality ambiguity and the market mechanism for credence goods
(2004) Benner, Dietrich
With credence goods consumers cannot judge actual quality neither before purchase - ex ante - nor after purchase - ex post -. Trust has to replace own examination and verification. Applying Choquet-Expected Utility theory, a general model of credence goods is developed which takes the problem of trust explicitly in its view and generalizes the problem of quality uncertainty on the ?market for lemons? of Akerlof (1970) to ?quality ambiguity? with credence goods. The model shows the market mechanism only performing well in providing credence goods when consumers? trust in given information is not too low. With trust too low, sellers of credence goods will be driven out of the market by trust induced adverse selection. In market equilibrium prices will always be lower compared to equilibrium prices for experience goods.
The international sales accelerator : a project management tool for improving sales performance in foreign target markets
(2018) Gerybadze, Alexander; Wiesenauer, Simone
There is a current research gap in the marketing and management literature regarding the setup of sales and distribution structures as well as the rollout in foreign target markets in order to establish countrywide presences. Due to this gap, we developed the International Sales Accelerator Model. The data collection and verification of the model took place during a thirdparty funds project with Baden-Württemberg’s business development agency, and environmental agency. The results reveal that the model represents a summary of best practices from different internationalization processes of very large companies. It is a seven-stage project management tool with the objective to improve the sales performance of companies entering foreign target markets.