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Abstract (English)
We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide evidence for a weak expressive function of law: while the initial impact of high obligations on behavior is strong, it decreases over time. Asymmetric obligations are as effective as symmetric ones. Our results are compatible with the argument that expressive law affects behavior by attaching an emotional cost of disobeying the own obligation.
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Publication series
FZID discussion papers; 28
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Faculty
State Institutes
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
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Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung
Institute of Economics
Institute of Economics
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ISBN
Language
English
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Classification (DDC)
330 Economics
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Standardized keywords (GND)
Sustainable Development Goals
BibTeX
@techreport{Schildberg-Hörisch2011,
url = {https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/5481},
author = {Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah and Riedel, Nadine},
title = {Asymmetric obligations},
year = {2011},
school = {Universität Hohenheim},
series = {FZID discussion papers},
}