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Abstract (English)
This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.
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Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2019,15
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Faculty
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Institute
Institute of Economics
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Cite this publication
Grüb, J. (2019). Mergers and partial tacit collusion. https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6459
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Language
English
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Classification (DDC)
330 Economics
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University bibliography
Standardized keywords (GND)
Sustainable Development Goals
BibTeX
@techreport{Grüb2019,
url = {https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6459},
author = {Grüb, Jens},
title = {Mergers and partial tacit collusion},
year = {2019},
school = {Universität Hohenheim},
series = {Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences},
}