Mergers and partial tacit collusion

Grüb, Jens

Mergers and partial tacit collusion

dc.contributor.author	Grüb, Jens	de
dc.date.accessioned	2024-04-08T08:58:22Z
dc.date.available	2024-04-08T08:58:22Z
dc.date.created	2020-01-14
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies whether mergers may lead to partial tacit collusion, thereby having the potential to induce simultaneous coordinated and non-coordinated effects. We use a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with heterogeneous discount factors to derive conditions for profitable and stable collusion and provide a numerical example. Mergers that change the market structure in a way such that maverick firms are eliminated or colluding firms reach a critical share in total capacity can lead to partial collusion.	en
dc.identifier.swb	1687247234
dc.identifier.uri	https://hohpublica.uni-hohenheim.de/handle/123456789/6459
dc.identifier.urn	urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-16981
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences; 2019,15
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	en
dc.rights.license	publ-mit-pod	de
dc.rights.uri	http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/doku/lic_mit_pod.php
dc.subject	Partial collusion	en
dc.subject	Tacit collusion	en
dc.subject	Mergers	en
dc.subject	Coordinated effects	en
dc.subject	Non-coordinated effects	en
dc.subject	Umbrella effects	en
dc.subject.ddc	330
dc.subject.gnd	Unternehmenszusammenschluss	de
dc.title	Mergers and partial tacit collusion	de
dc.type.dcmi	Text	de
dc.type.dini	WorkingPaper	de
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	en
local.access	uneingeschränkter Zugriff	de
local.bibliographicCitation.publisherPlace	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.faculty.number	3	de
local.institute.number	520	de
local.opus.number	1698
local.series.issueNumber	2019,15
local.series.title	Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
local.university	Universität Hohenheim	de
local.university.faculty	Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences	en
local.university.faculty	Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften	de
local.university.institute	Institute for Economics	en
local.university.institute	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre	de

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